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Using two new datasets, the authors examine whether 
the presence of banks affects the profitability and 
outreach of microfinance institutions. They find evidence 
that competition matters. Greater bank penetration 
in the overall economy is associated with microbanks 
pushing toward poorer markets, as reflected in smaller 
average loans sizes and greater outreach to women. The 
evidence is particularly strong for microbanks relying 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort 
in the department to understand the development and impact of microfinance. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at rcull@worldbank.org or ademirguckunt@
worldbank.org.
on commercial funding and using traditional bilateral 
lending contracts (rather than the group lending methods 
favored by microfinance nongovernmental organizations). 
The analysis  considers plausible alternative explanations 
for the correlations, including relationships that run 
through the nature of the regulatory environment and 
the structure of the banking environment; but it fails to 
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In December 2003, bank regulators estimated that there was one ATM in Bangladesh for 
every 1.7 million citizens, and one deposit-taking bank branch for every 22,000 people.
1  
In Bolivia, there was one ATM for every 21,000 people, and just one deposit-taking bank 
branch for every 65,000 people.  Bangladesh and Bolivia, though, are notable as early 
sites in which microfinance first took root and grew rapidly.  Was the lack of financial 
depth in the banking system a help or a hindrance to microfinance?  This paper is a first 
attempt to gauge how the presence of formal, regulated providers of financial services in 
an economy affects the profitability and outreach of financial institutions targeted 
narrowly to the under-banked and unbanked.   
Microfinance banks (“microbanks”) target low-income communities, and most 
make loans without requiring collateral (or are far more flexible than most mainstream 
commercial banks about the kinds of collateral required to secure loans).  They are micro 
not because of their institutional scale but because of the scale of typical transactions with 
customers.  Loan sizes range from under $100 to roughly $5000, and operational scale 
varies from several hundred customers to several million.  The most famous microbank, 
Grameen Bank, serves nearly 8 million customers in Bangladesh with an average loan 
balance of $79in 2007.
2  If the growth of microfinance has demonstrated nothing else, 
large numbers of low-income borrowers can be served while achieving a remarkably high 
level of repayment. Billions of dollars in loans to over one hundred million borrowers are 
outstanding, and data from top lenders show that only 2-3 percent of those are delinquent 
in recent years (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch, 2009b).
3   
The industrial organization of microfinance and the broader banking sector has 
received little attention so far, but as central banks set the stage for the rapid expansion of 
                                                 
1 Calculation is from Beck et al (2007), Table I. 
2 Armendáriz and Morduch (2005) describe the economics of microfinance, and Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Morduch (2009b) describe recent trends and data.  Data on Grameen Bank loan balance are from the Mix 
Market, as of December 2007 (www.mixmarket.org/en/demand/demand.show.profile.asp?ett=1658, 
accessed November 22, 2008). Grameen Bank reports having 7.9 million customers as of July 2009 
(www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=453&Itemid=527, accessed 
September 1, 2009). 
3 These calculations are for a sample of leading microfinance institutions that serve 18 million borrowers. 
Loans are defined as delinquent if they are at least thirty days overdue.   3 
 
“inclusive” banking, it becomes integral to understand how efforts to reach low-income 
and excluded populations relate to larger economic and financial contexts.  The small 
scale of transactions means that microbanks tend to operate in niches which are little-
penetrated by mainstream commercial banks, though competition is emerging, especially 
with the increasing commercialization of microfinance.  Economic theory suggests that a 
more developed banking sector can both help and hinder the profitability of microbanks.  
The balance rests largely with the relative strengths of positive spillovers from 
agglomeration effects and a stronger regulatory environment versus negative spillovers 
that arise as competition undermines the dynamic incentives at the root of microfinance 
loan contracts. Determining the balance is ultimately an empirical question.  Our results 
show that the strongest impacts on microbanks of competition from the formal financial 
sector are on the nature of microbanking services and markets, rather than their 
profitability.  Competition appears to drive microbanks toward niches characterized by 
smaller-scale loans (suggesting poorer customers) than would otherwise be the case. 
To a large extent, competition has gone under-studied due to lack of data, 
regarding both the reach of formal (non-microbank) providers of financial services and 
the performance and outreach of microfinance institutions themselves. Recent 
improvements in the data on both fronts enable us to undertake our analysis. We build on 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007) which contains indicators of banking 
sector outreach for 99 countries that are constructed from aggregate data provided by 
bank regulators. The focus is on banks because they provide the vast majority of financial 
services in developing countries.  As regulated institutions, their statistical information is 
relatively reliable and comparable across the sector. 
We add measures of the number of bank branches, ATMs, and loan and deposit 
accounts to complement standard indicators of the depth and efficiency of financial 
systems, such as the ratio of private credit to GDP and net interest margins.
4 The 
additional variables add potentially useful information (for example, the correlation 
between branches per square kilometer and the ratio of private credit to GDP is 0.44: 
                                                 
4 Recent empirical research indicates strongly that financial development as measured by these indicators 
has a causal effect on economic growth (Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Levine 2005; Levine, Loayza, 
and Beck 2000; and Rajan and Zingales 1998). 4 
 
strong but far from perfect). Firms report facing less severe financing obstacles in 
countries that score higher on the added measures of banking outreach, even when the 
level of private credit is controlled for in regressions (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Martinez Peria, 2007). We show that the added banking outreach measures are 
significantly associated with the profitability and outreach of microfinance institutions 
whereas other measures of banking sector development and efficiency are not. 
Our primary goal is to offer evidence on the effects of competition on the 
profitability and outreach of microfinance institutions. By combining a new dataset on 
the performance of microfinance providers with another on the outreach of banks, we 
also hope to make a contribution to the broader issue of how competition can affect 
access to financial services, especially among the poor. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes recent research 
on competition between financial institutions.  In section 3 we describe our data, lay out 
the basic regression equation, and discuss our hypotheses. In section 4 we present the 
base results comparing the relationship between bank penetration measures and 
microfinance outcomes with that between other standard measures of financial 
development and microfinance performance. We then compare the characteristics of 
microfinance institutions in high- and low-bank penetrations areas, and discuss the 
exogeneity of the bank penetration measures. Section 5 builds on the base results in an 
attempt to identify the types of microfinance institutions that account for the basic 
relationships we find between bank penetration and microfinance outreach and 
profitability.  
Relative to NGOs, commerically-oriented microbanks tend to make larger loans 
and serve fewer women as a share of customers.  But we find that with greater bank 
penetration, commercially-oriented microbanks push toward deeper outreach to the poor 
(as proxied by smaller average loans sizes) and greater outreach to women. 
Section 6 explores competing explanations and the robustness of causal claims. 
The first centers on selection issues by focusing on the subset of older microfinance 
institutions (those in existence prior to 1996).  Since a substantial part of the entry of 5 
 
banks in developing countries has occurred in recent years, that is, after 1995, it is 
plausible that this subset of institutions was most likely to be affected by competition. 
Stronger results for this subset can be viewed as support for the notion that competition 
with banks had a causal effect on microfinance outcomes. Weaker results would indicate 
that our base results are driven by new entrants to microfinance. This could indicate that 
selection effects drove microfinance institutions with particular performance profiles to 
locate in areas with greater bank presence, but that competition with those banks was not 
causally linked to outcomes. We then turn to the potential roles of banks’ ownership type 
(foreign and state), the degree of concentration in the banking sector, and regulation and 
supervision for microfinance outcomes. As described below, there are plausible reasons 
to believe that our results for the bank penetration variables reflect aspects of banking 
sector structure or incentives brought about by supervision rather than competition, but 
the data do not support that conclusion.  For readers that remain concerned that bank 
branch development could be endogenous to the profitability and outreach of 
microfinance institutions, we provide instrumental variables regressions in section 7.  
Concluding remarks appear in Section 8. 
2.  Financial Sector Competition 
There is a large literature on competition between banks, but the most relevant aspect for 
our purposes relates to methods for lending to small businesses. Loans to small 
businesses comprise a higher share of the assets of small banks than of large ones 
(Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise, 1995), and that share declines after large banks are 
involved in mergers and acquisitions (Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell, 1998). There 
is also evidence suggesting that small firms rely on relatively deep relationships with 
their banks in which they are better able to convey ‘soft information’ about their 
creditworthiness, information that is not contained in financial statements. Stronger bank-
borrower relationships are associated with lower interest rates on loans and reduced 
collateral requirements (Berger and Udell, 1995) and with greater credit availability 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995). 6 
 
Studies also indicate that small banks are the preferred organizational structure if 
a lender wishes to extend credit based on soft information. Because the loan officer is the 
repository of soft information, an organization must enable her to act on this information 
and reward her for doing so.
5 Agency problems make this more difficult in large banks, 
and thus the preferred organizational structure is a small, closely-held bank with few 
managerial layers (Berger and Udell, 2002; Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein, 
2005). Empirical evidence indicates that large banks are less willing to lend to 
informationally challenged borrowers that lack adequate financial records and that, after 
controlling for the endogeneity of bank-firm matching, large banks lend at a greater 
distance, interact more impersonally with borrowers, have shorter and less exclusive 
relationships, and are less effective in alleviating credit constraints (Berger, Miller, 
Petersen, Rajan, and Stein, 2005).  
There are some indications that large banks are increasing their lending to small 
businesses. The distance between small firms and their lenders is increasing, bank-
borrower communication is becoming more impersonal, and distant firms are no longer 
required to be the highest quality credits, suggesting they have better access to credit 
(Petersen and Rajan, 2002). While large banks devote a lower share of assets to small 
business loans, recent evidence suggests that their lending to small firms is roughly in 
proportion to their presence in a local market (Berger, Rosen, and Udell, 2007). Thus, 
local presence is more relevant for understanding large banks’ small business lending 
than is the total size of the organization. Coupled with previous results on the depth of 
bank-borrower relationships, this also suggests that large banks are using alternative 
methods to reach small borrowers that do not rely on soft information such as credit 
scoring methods (Akhavein, Frame, and White, 2005; Berger, Frame, and Miller, 2005). 
Although this is the first paper we know of on competition between microfinance 
institutions and other providers of financial services, there is a small literature on 
competition between microfinance institutions themselves. McIntosh, de Janvry, and 
Sadoulet (2005) (MDS), for example, study the effects of entry by new providers of 
                                                 
5 In the microfinance context, theoretical approaches focus nearly entirely on models without information 
acquisition by loan officers, even though in practice much information is acquired and, as a matter of 
theory, information revelation may lead to superior outcomes (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2005). 7 
 
microfinance on large incumbent microfinance institutions in Uganda. Entry was tilted 
toward areas where there was a high pre-existing level of penetration by microfinance 
institutions and banks, and high pre-existing utilization of the formal banks, all 
indications that microfinance institutions compete with banks. Although they do not test 
whether entry affects incumbents’ profitability, they do show that repayment rates 
declined in areas where entry was most pronounced, which should have a negative impact 
on profits. On outreach, there is no evidence that loan sizes changed as a result of entry 
(with larger loans being a proxy for less outreach), that client dropout rates rose, or that 
new client enrollment declined, though MDS speculate that this is because the Ugandan 
microfinance market was far from saturated. There is, however, evidence that the average 
savings balance at incumbent microfinance institutions declined, consistent with the 
notion that clients deployed some of those savings with the new entrants, a further sign of 
competition. 
MDS point out that certain clients find it easier to migrate to new entrants than 
others, in large part because of their ability to signal their creditworthiness. For example, 
borrowers with large businesses and substantial cash flows are more likely to leave 
incumbent lenders as new entrants arrive. In part, this is likely due to demand 
considerations as these borrowers are more likely to prefer more flexible financing than 
the group lending arrangements that are prevalent in Uganda (and elsewhere) can 
provide, though it also indicates that entrants are able to identify the incumbents’ most 
promising clients. Their evidence also suggests that clients ‘double-dip,’ borrowing from 
both entrants and incumbents at the same time, an issue termed “overlapping” in 
Bangladesh (e.g., Chaudhury and Matin, 2002). Coupled with the decline in repayment 
rates, this suggests that lenders are not able to identify a borrower’s total outstanding 
indebtedness, an information problem emphasized in McIntosh and Wydick (2005). 
However, repayment rates do not decline in districts with higher education levels, 
consistent with the notion that those borrowers better understand dynamic incentives and 
the consequences of non-repayment. In short, the Ugandan results suggest that borrowers 
with a particular profile are more likely to be poached by new entrants than others. In 
principle, those new entrants could be banks rather than microbanks.  8 
 
3.  Data and Hypotheses 
If banks provide competition for microfinance institutions, greater branch penetration 
should compel microfinance institutions to explore new market niches, furthering access 
by making smaller loans (presumably to less wealthy customers) and lending more to 
women.  We should see that as a negative relationship between branch penetration and 
the average size of microfinance loans and a positive relationship between branch 
penetration and the share of women borrowers (smaller loans sizes and more lending to 
women are both proxies for the depth of outreach). 
Competition should also depress microfinance profits, since microbanks would 
likely lose some of their better customers to commercial banks.  We would thus expect a 
negative relationship between branch penetration and measures of microfinance 
profitability. 
The literature also suggests that commercially-oriented microbanks focused on 
standard bilateral loans to individual customers (as opposed to the “group loans” with 
joint liability made famous by Grameen Bank) will be more affected by competition with 
banks than would be NGOs (non-governmental organizations) with the strongest social 
missions as reflected by depth of outreach.
6  We therefore test whether commercially-
oriented providers of microfinance, whose client profiles are probably closer to those 
prized by banks that are interested in this market niche, are affected by competition to a 
greater extent than other providers. As emphasized in Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Morduch (2009b), commercially-oriented microfinance institutions are more likely to 
have for-profit status and to employ an individual lending method, with larger loans, 
fewer women customers, lower costs per dollar lent, higher costs per borrower, and 
greater profitability.  By contrast, non-government microfinance organizations (NGOs) 
are more likely to be non-profits, relying on group lending methods that entail smaller 
loans, more female clients, greater reliance on subsidized funding, higher costs per dollar 
lent, and less profitability.  By identifying the types of microfinance institutions that have 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and Morduch (2009a) on the differential effects of regulation and 
supervision on these two groups. 9 
 
the strongest relationships with our branch penetration variables, we aim to further 
underscore the plausibility of our results as reflecting the effects of competition. 
Data  
We combine data on bank penetration from 99 developed and developing countries from 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007) with data from 346 leading 
microfinance institutions from 67 developing countries. Country coverage is not perfectly 
overlapping across the two data sets, and missing data for some of the control variables in 
our regressions further reduces the sample. We are therefore left with 342 observations 
from 238 microfinance institutions in 38 developing countries in our largest regressions 
that incorporate bank penetration variables.  
The data on microfinance institutions were collected by the Microfinance 
Information eXchange (or the MIX), a not-for-profit private organization that aims to 
promote information exchange in the microfinance industry. These data include outreach 
and impact data, financial data, audited financial statements, and general information on 
specific microfinance institutions for 346 microfinance institutions in 67 developing 
countries.
7  These institutions are large by the standards of the microfinance industry, 
with nearly 18 million active microfinance borrowers and a combined total of $25.3 
billion in assets (in purchasing power parity terms). Participation by microfinance 
institutions in the MIX is voluntary, and thus the sample is skewed toward institutions 
that have stressed financial objectives and profitability. We expect that these are more 
likely to compete with banks than are smaller, less profit-oriented microfinance 
institutions, and thus are well suited to the analysis we undertake below. 
The microfinance data are collected for publication in the Microbanking Bulletin 
(MBB) and have been adjusted to help ensure comparability across institutions when 
                                                 
7 This is a substantial increase over the MIX database used in Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2007), 
which contained information from 124 MFIs in 49 countries. That data set was a variant of the so-called 
MBB 9 database. In this paper, we use a variant of the MBB 10 database. There are 540 observations in our 
database because some MFIs report information for multiple years. 10 
 
measuring profitability.
8 In addition to standard entries from the balance sheet and 
income statements, the dataset contains qualitative information on the lending style 
employed by the MFI (group versus individual-based lending), the range of services it 
offers, its profit status, ownership structure, charter status, and sources of funds. Many of 
these serve as important controls in the regressions that follow. 
We estimate the following basic regression: 
(1) MFI Outcomeit = α + β1Bank Penetrationit  
                + β2Real Yieldit  MFI Productivity 
                + β3Capital Costs/Assetsit   
                +β4Labor/Costsit   
                +β5Village Bank Lendingit  MFI Lending Method  
                +β6Solidarity Group Lendingit  
                +Β7Ln(age)it  Other MFI Characteristics 
                +Β8Ln(assets)it  
                +β9Inflation Rateit Country  Characteristics 
                + β10Real GDP Growth Rateit   
                + β11 KKM Index of Inst. Developmentit  
                +Β12Rural Population Shareit  
                +Β13Rural Population Growthit  
                +Β14Regionit  
                + εi  
 
Where Outcome is a measure of the profitability or “depth of outreach” of microfinance 
institution i in year t. The profitability measures that we use are the Financial Self-
Sufficiency (FSS) Index and return on assets (ROA). Both measures are adjusted as 
described above. The FSS ratio is a measure of an institution’s ability to generate 
sufficient revenue to cover its costs.
9  Values below one indicate that it is not doing so. 
We prefer that ratio because it offers a more complete summary of inputs and outputs 
than standard financial ratios such as return on assets or equity. Our proxies for the depth 
of outreach of a microfinance institution are the share of its borrowers that are women 
                                                 
8 These include adjustments for inflation, the cost of subsidized funding, current-year cash donations to 
cover operating expenses, donated goods and services, write-offs, loan loss reserves and provisioning, a 
reclassification of some long-term liabilities as equity, and the reversal of any interest income accrued on 
non-performing loans.   
9 The financial self-sufficiency ratio is adjusted financial revenue divided by the sum of adjusted financial 
expenses, adjusted net loan loss provision expenses, and adjusted operating expenses.  It indicates the 
institution’s ability to operate without ongoing subsidy, including soft loans and grants.  The definition is 
from MicroBanking Bulletin (2005), p. 57. 11 
 
and its average loan size relative to the average per capita income of the bottom 20% in 
the country. Smaller loan sizes and a higher share of lending to women are correlated 
with deeper outreach to the poor and excluded groups. 
We estimate the models using a robust clustering method that accounts for both 
heteroskedasticity and correlation across multiple observations from the same 
microfinance institution.
10 Because observations from the same institution are likely to be 
correlated, OLS techniques can underestimate errors (thus overestimating significance 
levels). Including fixed effects for microfinance institutions was not possible because we 
have no more than three observations for any single institution. For most institutions, we 
have only one. 
The key explanatory variables in our analysis are measures of bank penetration, 
namely the number of bank branches in a country measured per capita (which we refer to 
as demographic penetration) and per square kilometer (geographic penetration, hereafter). 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007) offer additional measures of 
penetration based on the number of ATMs and the number and size of deposits and loan 
accounts. We feel that the branch penetration measures are a better reflection of the 
potential for personal contact with clients, which we speculate would be necessary to 
compete for the clients of microfinance institutions.  
In focusing on the number of branches in a country, we cannot distinguish 
whether these branches belong to small or large banks, or where they are located within a 
country. We are therefore open to the possibility that banks might compete for a subset of 
clients of microfinance institutions, through either relationship lending based on soft 
information or the new methods based on hard information that are favored by larger 
banks. That said, because our analysis is restricted to developing countries with relatively 
under-developed banking systems, we suspect that relationship lending based on soft 
information would be the most likely method for banks to compete with microfinance 
institutions. 
                                                 
10 We also clustered standard errors at the country level and derived similar qualitative results. We do not 
present those results here. 12 
 
Because banks are so much larger than microfinance institutions in almost all 
developing countries, we contend that the decisions of banks to extend their branch 
networks were made independent of the presence and activities of microfinance 
institutions. It is therefore logical to treat the penetration variables as exogenous in our 
regressions, though we will return to this issue below. 
In the base regressions we also replace the branch penetration variables with 
standard measures of financial development that have been used in the literature on 
financial development and growth (Levine, 2005). The measures we use are the ratios of 
private credit and liquid liabilities to GDP, which reflect the size of the banking sector, 
and the interest rate spread, that is, the difference between prevailing lending and deposit 
interest rates, as a proxy for banking sector efficiency.
11 To the extent that all of these 
measures are correlated with microfinance profitability and outreach, it would seem 
unlikely that our penetration measures capture the potential for banks to reach 
microfinance customers, as we had hoped, and thus cast doubt on the notion that we are 
picking up the effects of competition in our regressions. By contrast, if we find 
significant relationships only for the branch penetrations variables, it reinforces our case. 
We then alter our base regressions by interacting the branch penetration variables 
with variables reflecting the degree of commercialization of each microfinance 
institution. As described above, commercialized microfinance institutions have a profile 
distinct from others, earning higher profits by making larger loans at lower cost per dollar 
lent (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and Morduch, 2009b). The variables we use are a dummy 
variable indicating that an institution receives the majority of its funding from 
commercial sources, another indicating whether the institution makes loans on an 
individual (as opposed to a group liability) basis, and a final dummy variable indicating 
whether it is chartered as a non-governmental organization.
12  
                                                 
11 For descriptions of standard indicators of financial development and their use see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Levine (2000). 
12 Commercial funding includes deposits and commercial borrowing which is divided by total funding. 
Total funding also includes donations, non-commercial borrowing (i.e., at non-market rates), and equity, 
which tends not to reflect true commercial investment for most microfinance institutions (Cull, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Morduch, 2009b). 13 
 
Most of the control variables in equation (1) are the same as those used in other 
studies of MFI performance and outreach (Ahlin and Lin, 2006; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Morduch, 2007). Yield is the real gross portfolio yield, a measure of average interest 
charges faced by customers.  Because loan losses are not netted out of the revenues, this 
measure is intended to capture the ex-ante interest rate charged by the lender rather than 
the ex-post interest rate realized on the portfolio. In other studies, portfolio yields have 
been positively linked to profitability measures (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch, 
2007, 2009a). The ratios of capital costs and labor costs to assets are included in the 
regressions as measures of the productive efficiency of microfinance institutions. The 
same studies find that those costs measures are negatively linked to profitability. 
We control for the lending methods of the microfinance institutions with dummy 
variables for village bank lending and solidarity group lending. Solidarity group lenders 
employ contracts based on joint liability. Loans are made to individuals, but the group, 
which has between 3 and 10 members depending on the institution and location, 
shoulders responsibility for a loan if a member cannot repay. Village bank lenders tend to 
make loans to larger groups. In some cases, each branch forms a single, large group and 
is given a degree of self-governance. In Uganda’s village banks, for example, joint 
liability loans are made to groups of twenty or more. There is no extensive screening, no 
collateral is required, loans are smaller, and interest rates are higher than for other lenders 
(McIntosh, de Janvry, and Sadoulet, 2005). The omitted category in our regressions is 
therefore “individual lenders” (shorthand for microbanks that lend to individuals using 
standard bilateral contracts between the lender and a single borrower).
13 
Institution-specific characteristics are captured by controls for the age and size 
(measured by total assets) of microfinance institutions. Well-established microbanks 
might have a different profile than recent entrants, especially in terms of profitability. 
Similarly, larger microbanks might be better able to take advantage of scale economies 
that improve their profitability, though they may rely on larger loans to do so. 
                                                 
13 In the regressions that interact the individual lending dummy with the bank penetration variables, we 
change the omitted category to include both the solidarity group lenders and the village banks. 14 
 
The regressions also include a number of country-level controls. The inflation 
rate and real GDP growth summarize the macroeconomic environment. High inflation 
makes it difficult for borrowers and lenders to contract with one another, though the 
impact on lending by microfinance institutions is somewhat muted (Ahlin and Lin, 2006). 
Growth has a strong impact on MFI performance, in terms of financial sustainability, 
lower default rates, and growth in loan size (Ahlin and Lin, 2006; Ahlin, Lin, and Maio, 
2008). Overall, these results suggest that the country context is an important determinant 
of MFI performance. 
Institutional development is captured by the KKM index, a measure of broad 
institutional development created by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Maztruzzi (2007). Although 
group lenders use informal mechanisms to secure high levels of repayment, microfinance 
institutions that lend to individuals might benefit from adherence to the rule of law and 
well-functioning supporting institutions that help to enforce contracts such as courts, 
which could improve their profits and enable them to make smaller loans. The rural 
population share (in 1990) is included because forming solidarity groups might be more 
difficult in sparsely populated areas and contact between borrowers and individual 
lenders that are not located nearby is likely to be problematic. We also include rural 
population growth (since 1990), since McIntosh, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2005) found 
that most of the microfinance entry in Uganda in the 1990s occurred in rural areas. We 
therefore want to control for the possibility that rapidly growing rural areas might attract 
microfinance institutions with a different profitability-outreach profile. Finally, region is 
a matrix of dummy variables for each main region of the developing world, with “Latin 
America and the Caribbean” as the omitted category, since profitability-outreach profiles 
might differ along regional dimensions that are not captured by our other regressors. 
Summary statistics for all of our dependent and explanatory variables, and 
descriptions of how they were constructed, are available in appendix A. We present the 
correlations between those variables in Table 1. The bi-variate relationships follow 
expectations based on the existing literature that uses this (or a similar) database. For 
example, the correlations are consistent with the notion that larger, commercially-funded 15 
 
microfinance institutions are more profitable, make larger loans, and have lower costs per 
dollar of assets. 
4. Base  Results 
Base results for the outreach measures (average loan size and the share of women 
borrowers) are in Table 2; those for profitability (financial self sufficiency−FSS−index 
and return on assets) appear in Table 3. The results for many of the control variables are 
in line with previous estimates (Ahlin and Lin, 2006; Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Morduch, 2007, 2009a). For example, the cost and portfolio yield variables are strongly 
correlated with profitability in the predicted ways (negative for cost, positive for portfolio 
yield), and the village and solidarity group lending variables are strongly associated with 
smaller loans sizes and more lending to women. The rural population growth variable is 
strongly associated with greater lending to women, suggesting the importance of rural 
controls. 
The key variables in our analysis are the bank branch penetration variables. If 
competition from banks affects microfinance institutions, spurring outreach by 
compelling them to pursue new market niches, we would expect a negative relationship 
between bank penetration and average loan size, which is true for the demographic 
branch penetration variable (per capita branches) in Table 2, model 2. We expect a 
positive relationship with the share of women borrowers, which we see for the 
geographic penetration variable (branches per sq. km) in model 6. We also expected bank 
penetration to have a dampening effect on the profits of microfinance institutions, and we 
find weak evidence in support of that conjecture for return on assets in Table 3, model 7, 
though we do not find significant results for the financial self-sufficiency index. 
In three of eight possible cases in Tables 2 and 3, we find significant coefficients 
for the bank penetration variables. While we acknowledge that this is not overwhelming 
support for our main hypothesis, the base results provide some indications that 
competition from banks reduces the profits of microfinance institutions and compels 
them to expand their outreach. In contrast, standard measures of financial development 
(private credit/GDP, liquid liabilities/GDP, and bank interest rate spreads) are statistically 16 
 
significant in only one of twelve possible cases in Tables 2 and 3. In the one significant 
case, higher interest rate spreads are associated with lower average loan sizes, a result 
that is likely driven by selection because smaller loans entail more costs and require 
higher spreads, and thus the result says little about the effects of competition from banks 
on microfinance institutions.  The general lack of significance for the standard indicators 
of financial development makes it more plausible that our measures of bank branch 
penetration are reasonable proxies for the competition imposed on microfinance 
institutions by banks. 
The validity of the base results rests on the assumption that banks’ decisions to 
expand their branch networks are made independent of the presence and activities of 
microfinance institutions. Given their respective sizes, we feel this is a reasonable 
assumption, and the data bear this out. If we think of our analysis as summarizing an 
experiment in which microfinance institutions are randomly assigned bank penetration 
levels, we would expect that the types of microfinance institutions found in high and low-
bank penetration areas would be similar. We would also hope that the characteristics 
other than bank penetration of the countries in which those institutions are located are 
similar. 
In Table 4 we split the sample of microfinance institutions and the countries in 
which they reside into two sub-samples, based on high and low bank branch penetration. 
Countries with penetration levels above the sample median are defined as high 
penetration areas, those below are in low penetration areas. We do this separately for the 
demographic and geographic penetration variables. Microfinance institutions in high and 
low-penetration areas are not significantly different from one another, except that 
microbanks constituted as NGOs are more prevalent in high geographic penetration areas 
and institutions tend to be slightly older in high penetration areas for both geographic and 
demographic penetration. Regarding country characteristics, areas with low levels of 
demographic penetration are slightly more rural and have slightly lower scores on the 
KKM index of institutional development. On the whole, however, the sample 
characteristics for high and low penetration areas are remarkably similar, suggesting that 
it is appropriate to treat those variables as exogenous in our regressions. 17 
 
5.  Which Microfinance Institutions Are Most Affected by Competition? 
Although there are some significant relationships between bank branch penetration and 
microfinance outcomes for the full sample, we expect that the relationships should be 
stronger for some institutions than for others. We hypothesized, for example, that 
microfinance institutions that rely heavily on commercial sources of finance would be 
more likely to behave like banks. Those microfinance institutions also tend to make loans 
to individuals rather than to groups and tend not to be non-governmental organizations 
(Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and Morduch, 2009b). We therefore expect any competitive 
effects to be more pronounced for commercially-funded microfinance institutions that 
make loans to individuals and less pronounced for those institutions that are NGOs when 
we interact bank branch penetration with those variables. 
Depth of outreach 
For example, the negative relationship between bank branch penetration and average loan 
size is much stronger for the microfinance institutions that we hypothesize would face 
stronger competition from banks (Table 5). Neither the demographic nor geographic 
penetration variable is significant when the interaction with the commercial funding and 
individual lender variables are introduced (models, 2-4 and 6-8). The coefficients on 
those interaction terms are, however, negative, large (in absolute value), and highly 
significant. By contrast, for NGOs the negative relationship is much less pronounced for 
demographic penetration and not significantly different from zero for the geographic 
penetration variable (See F-statistics at bottom of table). This pattern is consistent with 
the idea that NGOs alter their outreach much less than commercially-funded “individual” 
lenders in response to competitive pressures from banks, presumably because their focus 
was already on making small loans. 
A related pattern emerges for the share of lending to women borrowers (Table 6). 
When the commercial funding variable is interacted with geographic penetration in 
models 6 and 8, the penetration variable is no longer significant, but the interaction term 
is large, positive, and significant. There are also significant effects when the interactions 
for non-governmental organizations and individual lenders are introduced, but they are 18 
 
smaller than for commercially funded institutions (See F-statistics for models 5 and 7). 
The lack of statistical significance of the interaction terms in those models means that we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the relationship is the same for NGOs and individual 
lenders as it is for other microfinance institutions.  
However, when all three interactions enter the regression (model 8), we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the relationship between geographic penetration and the share 
of lending to women is zero for all lenders other than those that rely heavily on 
commercial funding. As in the base regressions, geographic penetration is related to 
lending to women but demographic penetration is not (models 1-4); the data cannot 
reveal why physical proximity is especially important for lending to women, though it 
may in part capture a correlation with population density in South Asia. The results for 
geographic penetration are, however, consistent with the idea that commercially-funded 
microfinance institutions increase outreach to women in response to competition from 
banks. 
Profitability 
The results for profitability differ from those for depth of outreach. Although there is a 
weak relationship between demographic penetration and profitability (as measured by the 
financial self-sufficiency −FSS−index) in model 4 with all three interaction terms, there 
are no significant negative relationships between the FSS index and either measure of 
branch penetration for non-governmental organizations, commercially funded 
institutions, or individual lenders (Table 7). We present only the results for the FSS 
index, noting that we found similarly insignificant relationships when using return on 
assets as the dependent variable. The only statistically significant relationship for the FSS 
index is a weak positive one for individual lenders in model 7 (see F-statistic), which 
likely reflects selection effects since it is inconsistent with greater competitive pressure 
from banks. For NGOs, the lack of significant results could reflect the fact that they do 
not compete directly with banks, in line with the results for the outreach measures. For 
commercially-funded institutions and those that make loans to individuals, this could 
mean that they are able to maintain their profitability even though competition forces 19 
 
them to enter a new market niche, making smaller loans to a pool of borrowers 
increasingly comprised of women. 
Taken together, these results support the notion that competition from banks 
compels commercially-funded microfinance institutions and those that make loans to 
individuals to increase their depth of outreach. 
6. Competing  Explanations 
In this section, we first re-run our models on the sub-sample of well-established 
institutions, since much bank penetration occurred after these institutions were already 
operating. For them, significant results would be more likely to reflect the effects of 
competition rather than selection. Second, we test whether our measures of bank branch 
penetration are actually proxies for other features of the banking sector, by including 
variables related to ownership and sector concentration.  Third, we test whether the 
significant relationships that we find are attributable to the effects of regulation and 
supervision of microfinance institutions rather than competition with banks. Fourth and 
finally, we examine whether competition from banks lowers the repayment rates on loans 
for microfinance institutions.  
Selection of Older Microfinance Institutions 
One explanation for the significant relationships found between bank penetration and the 
depth of outreach of microfinance institutions hinges on selection rather than 
competition. That is, microfinance institutions with particular characteristics, including 
depth of outreach, may tend to enter markets with high (or low) bank penetration. To the 
extent that is so, it is inaccurate to ascribe our results to competition with banks.
14  
To address whether selection is driving our results, we re-run our models on the 
subset of microfinance institutions that were in existence prior to 1996. We do so because 
                                                 
14 We note that even if selection is driving our results, the pattern suggests that those that make smaller 
loans and lend more to women are fitting themselves into high density markets, and thus are 
complementary to the banks that are already there. They are therefore making a contribution to expanded 
outreach, though they might not be competing directly with banks. 20 
 
our bank branch penetration variables come from the end of the period, and thus reflect 
the rapid expansion in the banking sectors of many developing countries since the mid-
1990s. The ratio of credit to the private sector divided by GDP increased substantially 
from 1995 to 2005 in the transition countries of Europe and Central Asia, in the Middle 
East and North Africa, and in South Asia, and increased somewhat in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Figure 1). There was no increase in East Asia and the Pacific or in Latin America, in part 
due the systemic financial crises there, and thus this approach is less appropriate for 
microfinance institutions from those regions. 
We present the models with interaction terms to capture our predictions about the 
types of microfinance institutions that would be most affected by competition with banks. 
We present only the results for geographic bank branch penetration to conserve space, 
though the results for demographic penetration are qualitatively similar. As in the results 
for the full sample, demographic penetration is strongly linked to smaller loan sizes but 
not significantly linked to the share of lending to women for the sample of older 
microfinance institutions. 
The results for the sub-sample of older microfinance institutions are generally 
similar to those for the full sample (Table 8 and Table 9). For example, there is no 
significant relationship between geographic penetration and average loans size for non-
governmental organizations. There is, however, a significant negative relationship for 
individual lenders. There is also a negative relationship for commercially-funded 
microfinance institutions (though here it is not statistically significant, while it was in the 
full sample). Demographic penetration (not shown) is, however, negative, large in 
absolute value, and highly significant for commercially-funded institutions, as it was for 
the full sample. The results for average loan size are therefore very similar to those for 
the full sample. 
The same is true for regressions on the share of women borrowers. There is a 
significant positive relationship between geographic penetration and the share of lending 
to women for non-governmental organizations and individual lenders, though we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the effect is the same as for other microfinance institutions. For 21 
 
commercially-funded institutions, the effect is somewhat stronger and we can reject the 
hypothesis that it is the same as for other microfinance institutions, since the coefficient 
on the interaction is significant, while that on the penetration variable is not (Table 8, 
model 7). As in the results for the full sample, older commercially-funded microfinance 
institutions appear more apt to increase lending to women in response to competition 
from banks. 
Results for profitability for the sample of older microfinance institutions differ 
from those for the full sample (Table 9). Models 1, 3, and 4 indicate that geographic 
penetration is negatively related to the financial self-sufficiency index for all types of 
microfinance institutions. However, model 2 indicates that the result is driven by NGOs, 
given that the relationship is not significant for other types of microfinance institutions in 
that regression.  Similar results do not hold when we use the return on assets as our 
measure of profitability, but that could be due to the limitations of that variable that we 
described above. 
At the risk of reading too much into a single regression, Model 2 suggests that 
older non-governmental organizations have a permanent reduction in FSS in countries 
with a high degree of competition from banks. The pattern is consistent with the notion 
that competition from banks compels those microbanks into a new market niche, and that, 
as a result, the FSS of non-governmental organizations suffers over time. The results are 
similar to findings on the effects of prudential supervision on the outreach and 
profitability of microfinance institutions: commercially oriented institutions are likely to 
curtail outreach, making larger loans and lending less to women to maintain their 
profitability.  Less commercially oriented institutions, such as non-governmental 
institutions, maintain their outreach but their profitability declines as a result of the costs 
of regulation and supervision (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and Morduch, 2009a). 
The findings for the subset of older microfinance institutions therefore reinforce 
our findings for the full sample. Indeed, the findings for the FSS index are stronger than 
they were in the full sample regressions. Because much of the bank entry and expansion 
summarised in our indicators of branch penetration occurred after these microfinance 22 
 
institutions were in existence, the sub-sample results make it more likely that the 
relationships we find are due to competition with banks rather than the non-random entry 
of microfinance institutions into particular banking environments. 
Banking Sector Ownership and Concentration 
A limitation of our branch penetration variables is that we do not know the identities of 
the banks to which those branches belong. The number of branches could be a proxy for 
underlying aspects of the structure and ownership of the banking sector that are driving 
our results. For example, foreign banks might focus on wealthier clients, and thus a high 
share of foreign ownership in the sector might coincide with a relatively less expansive 
branch network.
15 Alternatively, a high degree of state ownership in banking might imply 
an extensive branch network if the mandate of state-owned banks is to provide broad 
access to financial services. 
To test for these possibilities, we include three new variables in our regressions: 
the share of total banking sector assets held by foreign- and state-owned banks, 
respectively, and concentration measured as the share of sector assets held by the three 
largest banks. If those variables are significant while the penetration variables are not, it 
might cast doubt on whether our results are due to competition or, at the least, it would 
help us to understand the nature of the competition that most affects microfinance 
institutions.  
Ownership and concentration variables are, in fact, often significant in our 
regressions, but so too are the penetration variables. For example, greater state ownership 
in banking is associated with smaller loan sizes (Table 10). More surprisingly, the same is 
also true for our measure of banking concentration. Controlling for ownership and 
concentration, the branch penetration coefficients are similar to those we have reported 
thus far. There is a negative, significant relationship between branch penetration and 
average loan size for commercially funded institutions and those that make loans to 
                                                 
15 See Clarke et al. (2003) for a discussion of the role of foreign banks in developing countries. 23 
 
individuals. Those relationships are much more muted for non-governmental 
organizations. 
Bank concentration is negatively associated with the share of lending to women, 
as one might expect (Table 11). Perhaps more surprisingly, the same also holds for state 
ownership of banks. As in our previous results, the interaction between penetration and 
both the commercial funding and individual lending variables is positive and significant 
(in all but one case in models 3, 4, 7, and 8).
16 The interaction between demographic 
penetration and the non-governmental organization dummy is negative and significant in 
model 2, though we cannot reject that there is no relationship between either measure of 
penetration and the share of lending to women by non-governmental organizations based 
on the F-tests at the bottom of the table for models 2 and 6.   
Finally, there are no strong relationships between our penetration measures and 
profitability as measured by the FSS index in Table 12, except in model 4 which indicates 
that non-individual lenders have significantly lower profitability in areas with a high 
degree of demographic penetration. Weaker results for the profitability measures are also 
consistent with our main regressions. In short, the inclusion of bank ownership and 
concentration measures does not alter our conclusions. Bank branch penetration is 
associated with smaller loan sizes and more lending to women for commercially funded 
microfinance institutions and those that make loans to individuals. The same is not true 
for microfinance institutions that are non-governmental organizations. 
Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance Institutions 
The bank branch penetration variables might also be capturing the effects of  regulation 
and supervision if well-developed banking sectors, as reflected in deeper bank branch 
networks, spur more stringent regulatory and supervisory scrutiny of financial 
institutions, including providers of microfinance. We doubt this could be the case because 
formal supervision is associated with less outreach, meaning larger loans and less lending 
                                                 
16 We acknowledge, however, that we can only reject the hypothesis that the relationship between 
penetration and the share of lending to women is zero for commercially funded institutions when we use 
the demographic penetration measure (see F-test, model 3). In that sense, results are a bit weaker than when 
the bank ownership and concentration variables are not included in the regression. 24 
 
to women, for commercially oriented microfinance institutions (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, 
and Morduch, 2009a). This suggests that commercially oriented institutions curtail 
outreach to maintain profitability. Yet, in our analysis, branch penetration is strongly 
associated with smaller loans and more lending to women. Thus it is unlikely that the 
branch penetration variables are capturing the effects of supervision of microfinance 
providers.
17  
But to be sure about this, we include in our regressions a variable for whether an 
institution faces onsite supervision, meaning supervisors are physically present when 
reviewing their books. About half of the institutions in our sample face onsite 
supervision. The supervisory variable is not significant when included in our basic 
regressions, and the results for the branch penetration variables (and their interaction with 
other variables) are unchanged. The onsite supervision variable is associated positively 
with average loan size and negatively with lending to women, as expected, when the 
banking concentration and ownership variables are included in the regression. But the 
results for the penetration variables remain largely unchanged. Since the qualitative 
results of the models with onsite supervision are so similar to those we have already 
presented, we do not present them here. 
Competition and Loan Repayment 
In Uganda, competition between microfinance institutions led to lower repayment rates 
for incumbent providers (McIntosh, de Janvry, and Sadoulet, 2005). We would expect the 
same to be true for competition with banks, and we would again expect results to be 
stronger for the microfinance institutions most apt to compete, those that rely on 
commercial funding and lend to individuals.  
To check this, we use the share of the portfolio that is at risk, defined as thirty or 
more days overdue, as the dependent variable in our regressions. We find results similar 
to those found elsewhere in the literature. For example, individual lenders have a higher 
                                                 
17 It might be possible that penetration is associated with less stringent supervision if, for example, 
extensive branch networks reflect a laissez faire approach to expansion and other aspects of supervision, 
though this seems unlikely to us. 25 
 
share of at risk loans, while non-governmental organizations are a bit lower. We do not, 
however, find any significant relationships between the branch penetration variables (or 
their interactions) and portfolio at risk (and thus we do not present those results in the 
paper). Consistent with the results for the profitability measures, this pattern could 
suggest that, facing competition from banks, commercially funded institutions and those 
that lend to individuals expand their outreach without damaging the quality of their 
portfolios. However, we recognize that the absence of significant results could be stem 
from the inadequacy of our measure as an indicator of portfolio quality. 
 
7. Instrumental Variables Regressions 
We have made a strong case that bank branch penetration is exogenous to the profitability 
and outreach of microfinance institutions. On a priori grounds this seems likely, based on 
the large size of banks relative to microfinance institutions. And indeed we have shown 
that the average characteristics of microfinance institutions and they countries in which 
they reside are very similar in high- and low-bank branch penetration environments. 
Moreover, our results are stronger for older microfinance institutions, whose existence 
predates much of the rapid expansion of banking sector in the developing world since 
1995.  
Another concern is that a factor omitted from our regression is responsible for 
both relatively high levels of branching and increased outreach by microfinance 
institutions. And yet, the previous section shows that our results are robust to the 
inclusion of a number of potential candidates.  In sum, our evidence to this point suggests 
that the relationships between branching and the performance of microfinance institutions 
are causal. 
  Despite the foregoing, the endogeneity of financial development, especially as it 
relates to economic growth, has long been a concern in this literature (See Levine, 2005). 
As a final check of the robustness of results, we therefore follow the example of other 
authors by using dummy variables that identify the origin of countries’ company or 26 
 
commercial law as being English, French, German, or Socialist as instruments for our 
measures of bank branch penetration (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1998; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2003).
18  
The pattern of results in Table 13 is similar to that in the base models. For 
example, demographic branch penetration is strongly negatively related to average loan 
size (model 2). Moreover, the OLS and IV coefficients for that variable are very similar, 
and thus it is not a surprise that the Hausman test indicates that it is appropriate to treat 
demographic penetration as exogenous in that regression. That test does indicate that 
geographic branch penetration is endogenous (model 1), and the IV regression produces a 
negative significant coefficient whereas it had been insignificant in the OLS regression 
(Table 2, model 1). The relationships between the branch penetration variables and 
average loan size are therefore stronger in the IV models than in the base regressions.  
Neither branch penetration variable is significantly associated with the percentage 
of women borrowers in the IV regressions (models 3 and 4). However, Hausman tests 
indicate that it is appropriate to treat the penetration variables as exogenous, and thus the 
OLS results for that variable are valid. The specification tests indicate that endogeneity 
could be a concern in the profitability regressions. Significance levels for the 
demographic branch penetration variable are higher and coefficients are larger (in 
absolute value) in the IV regressions (models 6 and 8) than they were in the OLS 
regressions. The geographic branch penetration variable is insignificant in both the FSS 
and ROA regressions (models 5 and 7), but that was also true in the OLS regressions. Our 
instruments perform well in the models that include the demographic branch penetration 
variable in that they are relevant (partial Shea correlations of 0.29), and appear to be 
excludable, especially in the FSS regression (model 6). In short, the IV regressions 
reinforce the conclusions drawn from the OLS regressions.    
                                                 
18 Other authors have included a dummy variable to identify countries that have Scandinavian legal origin. 
None of the microfinance institutions in our sample come from such a country, and thus that variable is 
dropped from our regressions. 27 
 
8. Conclusions 
Around the world, policymakers, regulators, bankers, and activists are focusing on the 
promise of creating more inclusive financial sectors.  Until recently, microfinance 
institutions have filled market niches, with seemingly little interaction with the rest of the 
banking system.  As microfinance expands in parallel with the broadening of commercial 
banking sectors, the prospect for interaction—and direct competition—has increased 
sharply. 
This paper has taken a first empirical step to understand questions around the 
industrial organization of traditional banking and microbanking.  We find evidence that 
competition matters.  Greater bank penetration in the overall economy is associated with 
microbanks pushing toward poorer markets, as reflected by smaller average loans sizes 
and greater outreach to women—though there is no strong relationship with their 
profitability.  The evidence is particularly strong for microbanks relying on commercial-
funding and using traditional bilateral lending contracts (rather than group lending 
methods favored by microfinance NGOs).   
We consider plausible alternative explanations for the correlations, including 
relationships that run through the nature of the regulatory environment, but we fail to find 
strong support for these alternative hypotheses.  The evidence appears to be driven by 
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Table 1. Correlation matrix of variables 
* represents statistical significance at the 5% level. Average loan size is the average loan size relative to the average per capita income of the bottom 20% in the country. Percent women borrowers is the 
share of women borrowers of a microfinance institution. The financial self-sufficiency index is a ratio which is greater than one if an institution generates sufficient revenue to cover its costs. Geographic 
branch penetration is the number of bank branches in a country measured per square kilometer and demographic branch penetration is the number of bank branches measured per capita. Rural 
population(%, 1990) is the share of rural population in 1990. Rural population growth is the annual rural population growth rate averaged over 1991 – 2000. Log of MFI age is the log of the age of the 
institution and Log of assets(PPP) is the log of total assets in purchasing power parity terms. Village banking lending is a dummy variable that takes the value one if village bank lenders make loans to 
larger groups. Solidarity group lending and individual lending are dummy variables equal to one if the loan is made to an individual, but the former assumes joint liability. KKM is the Kaufmann, Kraay, 
Mastruzzi index of institutional development. GDP growth rate is annual real GDP growth rate. NGO is a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is a non-governmental organization. 







































Geographic branch penetration  –0.22*     0.16*   –0.05* –0.05* 
Demographic branch penetration  –0.23*   –0.02*   0.01 –0.01*    0.53* 
Rural population (%, 1990)  0.06   –0.02*   –0.07* –0.14*  0.00  –0.41* 
Rural population growth (%)  0.09   0.10   –0.18*  –0.14*  –0.11*  –0.53*    0.62* 
Real yield  –0.23*     0.23*    0.15*  0.09  0.03  0.01  –0.15*  –0.05* 
Capital costs / assets  –0.14*     0.24*   –0.34*  –0.31*  –0.12*  –0.07* –0.10*  0.01    0.55* 
Labor costs / assets  –0.23*     0.30*   –0.31*  –0.32*  –0.02* –0.02* –0.14*  –0.03*    0.65*    0.72* 
Log of MFI age   0.02   –0.02*     0.15*  0.05  0.10    0.13*  –0.09* 0.00  0.10  –0.13*  –0.05* 
Log of assets(PPP)     0.21*   –0.05*     0.13*    0.15*  –0.12*  –0.09*    0.14*    0.14*  –0.16*  –0.20*  –0.27*    0.29* 
Village banking lending  –0.19*     0.21*   –0.06* –0.12*  0.01  –0.06*  0.06    0.20*    0.27*    0.31*    0.31*  –0.04* 
Solidarity group lending  –0.21*     0.23*   –0.23*  –0.13*  0.10  –0.13*    0.29*    0.18*  0.04   0.08    0.15*  –0.13* 
Inflation    0.16*   0.03   –0.17*  –0.12*  –0.24*  –0.16*  –0.08* –0.08* –0.42*    0.03  –0.07* –0.14* 
KKM   0.08   0.11   0.03  0.10  –0.01*    0.36*  –0.43*  –0.26*    0.14*    0.16*    0.15*   0.14* 
GDP growth rate   –0.07*     0.13*   0.07  0.05  0.08  0.08  –0.11*  –0.18*    0.20*    0.12*  0.08   –0.06* 
NGO  –0.27*     0.28*   –0.26*  –0.18*    0.19*  0.10  –0.14*  0.01    0.28*    0.36*    0.43*   0.04 
Commercially funded    0.20*   –0.10*     0.36*    0.28*  0.03  0.00  –0.04*  0.06   0.00   –0.25*  –0.27*    0.34* 
Individual lending    0.32*   –0.39*     0.19*   0.11  –0.09*    0.16*  –0.30*  –0.27*   –0.18*   –0.21*  –0.27*    0.18* 
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Geographic branch penetration 
Demographic branch penetration 
Rural population (%, 1990) 
Rural population growth (%) 
Real Yield 
Capital costs / Assets 
Labor costs / Assets 
Log of MFI age 
Log of assets(PPP) 
Village banking lending –0.10* 
Solidarity group lending  0.00  –0.17* 
Inflation 0.07  –0.15*  –0.02* 
KKM  0.09  0.02  –0.15*    0.19* 
GDP growth rate  –0.11*  –0.01* 0.05 –0.13*  0.05 
NGO  –0.23*    0.24*    0.11*  –0.07*    0.11*    0.16* 
Commercially funded    0.35*  –0.08*  –0.26*  0.07    0.16*   –0.05* –0.34* 





Table 2. The effect of variables representing the development of the banking sector on the outreach of MFIs 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. All models 
estimated via ordinary least squares. Standard errors allow for clustering at the firm level. Average loan size is the average loan size relative to 
the average per capita income of the bottom 20% in the country. Percent women borrowers is the share of women borrowers of a microfinance 
institution. Geographic branch penetration is the number of bank branches in a country measured per square kilometer and demographic branch 
penetration is the number of bank branches measured per capita. Private credit / GDP and Liquid liabilities / GDP are the ratios of private credit 
and liquid liabilities to GDP, respectively, where GDP is gross domestic product. Interest rate spread is the difference between prevailing lending 
and deposit interest rates. Rural population(%, 1990) is the share of rural population in 1990. Rural population growth is the annual growth rate of 
the rural population averaged over 1991 – 2000.  Log of MFI age is the log of the age of the institution and Log of Assets(PPP) is the log of total 
assets in purchasing power parity terms. Village banking lending is a dummy variable that takes the value one if village bank lenders make loans 
to larger groups. Solidarity group lending and individual lending are dummy variables equal to one if the loan is made to an individual, but the 
former assumes joint liability. Individual lending dummy is the omitted category. KKM is the Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi index of institutional 
development. GDP growth rate is annual real GDP growth rate. Europe and Central Asia, Africa, South Asia, East Asia and Pacific, Middle East 
and North Africa are dummy variables that take the value one if the country is located in Europe and Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, South 
Asia, East Asia and Pacific, Middle East and North Africa, respectively. The omitted category is Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 






























  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)    (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Financial    -0.0150 -0.2523***  2.9349  -0.1686  -0.0097**   0.0062**  -0.0039  0.1693  0.0438  0.0000 
   variable  (0.0152)  (0.0867)  (2.7283)  (2.5680)  (0.0044)    (0.0028)  (0.0073)  (0.1121)  (0.1720)  (0.0010) 
Rural population  0.0232  0.0253  0.0418**  0.0379***  0.0462***    -0.0033  -0.0046**  -0.0029  -0.0032*  -0.0046**
   (%, 1990)  (0.0167)  (0.0173)  (0.0162)  (0.0137)  (0.0147)    (0.0023)  (0.0023)  (0.0018)  (0.0019)  (0.0019) 
Rural population  0.2240  -0.1867  0.4353  0.2505  0.2832    0.1156*** 0.0914***  0.0766***  0.0696*** 0.0841***
   growth(%)  (0.2843)  (0.3570)  (0.2691)  (0.2577)  (0.2008)    (0.0300)  (0.0307)  (0.0225)  (0.0258)  (0.0222) 
Real yield  -3.5341  -4.9849*  -2.1574  -2.7632  -5.1647***    0.3443*  0.2892  0.3368*  0.3146*  0.2651 
  (2.4658) (2.5850)  (1.9501)  (1.9294)  (1.9311)   (0.1830) (0.1961)  (0.1790)  (0.1788)  (0.1916) 
Capital costs /  1.9106  3.1687  3.5858  2.0044  4.3792    -0.0453  -0.0011  0.0942  0.0268  0.2172 
   Assets  (3.6242)  (3.6680)  (4.0456)  (3.7447)  (3.1772)    (0.3950)  (0.3987)  (0.4214)  (0.4239)  (0.4146) 
Labor costs /  -2.8711  -2.4450  -4.3684  -2.7299  1.9518    0.3987  0.4444  0.3277  0.4073  0.4267 
   Assets  (3.5729)  (3.6153)  (3.3775)  (3.2720)  (2.6149)    (0.4192)  (0.4262)  (0.4357)  (0.4294)  (0.4321) 
Log of MFI age  -0.2047  -0.2177  -0.3773  -0.3501  -0.2622    -0.0079  -0.0019  -0.0154  -0.0125  0.0031 
  (0.3503) (0.3445)  (0.3178)  (0.3209)  (0.2498)   (0.0312) (0.0319)  (0.0296)  (0.0297)  (0.0291) 
Log of assets        0.2061*  0.1949*  0.1948**  0.2050**  0.3341***    -0.0015  -0.0001  0.0004  0.0005  0.0103 
   (PPP)  (0.1128)  (0.1000)  (0.0957)  (0.0967)  (0.0916)   (0.0094) (0.0090) (0.0080) (0.0083) (0.0093) 
Village banking  -1.8629***  -1.9012***  -1.7956*** -1.7782*** -1.8206***  0.1344** 0.1306**  0.1570*** 0.1565*** 0.2618***
   lending  (0.4704)  (0.4779)  (0.4477)  (0.4380)  (0.4421)    (0.0579)  (0.0601)  (0.0545)  (0.0546)  (0.0503) 
Solidarity group  -1.8530***  -1.8351***  -1.6293***  -1.6818***  -1.3243***    0.1495*** 0.1492***  0.1517***  0.1486*** 0.1848***
   lending  (0.6623)  (0.6439)  (0.5839)  (0.5761)  (0.4719)    (0.0379)  (0.0393)  (0.0384)  (0.0383)  (0.0380) 
Inflation 0.0103  -0.0219  0.0570  0.0347  -0.0282    0.0082*** 0.0054  0.0083***  0.0075*** 0.0058** 
  (0.0600) (0.0616)  (0.0546)  (0.0547)  (0.0300)   (0.0031) (0.0035)  (0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0029) 
KKM 0.8161  1.8219**  0.8233  0.9582*  1.3059**    0.1095  0.1571*  0.0490  0.0537  -0.0105 
  (0.5441) (0.7045)  (0.5499)  (0.5259)  (0.5442)   (0.0737) (0.0850)  (0.0638)  (0.0652)  (0.0644) 
GDP   0.0782**  0.0740**  0.1069***  0.0859***  0.0794**    0.0034  0.0033  0.0035  0.0028  -0.0015 
   growth rate  (0.0320)  (0.0353)  (0.0316)  (0.0322)  (0.0328)    (0.0052)  (0.0052)  (0.0049)  (0.0050)  (0.0045) 
Europe  and  -1.0524  -1.3520*  -0.7518  -1.2830**  -0.4534    0.2010*** 0.2098***  0.1712*** 0.1452** 0.1935***
   Central Asia  (0.7403)  (0.8020)  (0.7078)  (0.6330)  (0.6283)    (0.0674)  (0.0676)  (0.0647)  (0.0661)  (0.0574) 
Africa 0.0430  -0.4430  -1.0358  -0.8421  -2.1487**    0.0208  0.1023  0.0220  0.0263  0.0226 
  (1.4977) (1.4898)  (1.2321)  (1.2991)  (0.8740)   (0.1144) (0.1132)  (0.0823)  (0.0830)  (0.0789) 
South  Asia  -2.1799* -1.9576* -3.2028***  -2.9087** -4.4006***   0.0736  0.2632**  0.1668 0.1744  0.5184***
  (1.1888) (1.0884)  (1.1149)  (1.2948)  (0.9337)   (0.1335) (0.1168)  (0.1079)  (0.1088)  (0.0764) 
East Asia and  -1.0764  -0.9012  -1.8434**  -1.4575*  -1.8526***    0.1139  0.2305***  0.1301*  0.1442**  0.1974***
   Pacific  (0.6539)  (0.5622)  (0.8455)  (0.8677)  (0.5560)    (0.0854)  (0.0774)  (0.0699)  (0.0714)  (0.0648) 
Middle-East  and  -1.1429  -0.2959 -3.7747*** -3.1310  -2.1339**    -0.2397  0.0427 0.1945**  0.2025**  0.2139***
   North Africa  (1.0181)  (1.3213)  (1.0874)  (1.9032)  (0.9813)    (0.2155)  (0.1301)  (0.0790)  (0.0975)  (0.0815) 
Constant 0.7766  3.4574*  -1.1985  0.0938  -1.7975    0.4170**  0.5257***  0.3707**  0.4261*** 0.2461 
  (1.8167) (2.0190)  (2.2955)  (2.1190)  (1.8813)   (0.1729) (0.1763)  (0.1612)  (0.1616)  (0.1918) 
Observations  342 342  375  375  324    285 285  333  333  287 
Number of firms  238  238  264  264  227    206  206  241  241  206 
Adjusted R




Table 3. The effect of variables representing the development of the banking sector on the performance of MFIs 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. All 
models estimated via ordinary least squares. Standard errors allow for clustering at the firm level. The financial self-sufficiency index 
is a ratio which is greater than one if the institution generates sufficient revenue to cover its costs. Geographic branch penetration is 
the number of bank branches in a country measured per square kilometer and demographic branch penetration is the number of bank 
branches measured per capita. Private credit / GDP and Liquid liabilities / GDP are the ratios of private credit and liquid liabilities to 
GDP, respectively, where GDP is gross domestic product. Interest rate spread is the difference between prevailing lending and deposit 
interest rates. Rural population(%, 1990) is the share of rural population in 1990. Rural population growth is the annual growth rate of 
the rural population averaged over 1991 – 2000.  Log of MFI age is the log of the age of the institution and Log of Assets(PPP) is the 
log of total assets in purchasing power parity terms. Village banking lending is a dummy variable that takes the value one if village 
bank lenders make loans to larger groups. Solidarity group lending and individual lending are dummy variables equal to one if the 
loan is made to an individual, but the former assumes joint liability. Individual lending dummy is the omitted category. KKM is the 
Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi index of institutional development. GDP growth rate is annual real GDP growth rate. Europe and Central 
Asia, Africa, South Asia, East Asia and Pacific, Middle East and North Africa are dummy variables that take the value one if the 
country is located in Europe and Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, East Asia and Pacific, Middle East and North Africa, 
respectively. The omitted category is Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 
 




























  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)    (6) (7)  (8)  (9) (10) 
Financial   0.0006  -0.0042  0.0991  -0.1782  -0.0006    0.0007  -0.0028*  0.0134  -0.0880  -0.0002 
   variable  (0.0023)  (0.0055)  (0.1151)  (0.1824)  (0.0005)    (0.0008)  (0.0016)  (0.0439)  (0.0614)  (0.0001) 
Rural  population  0.0017  0.0016 0.0010 0.0011 -0.0008    0.0001  -0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0004 
   (%, 1990)  (0.0019)  (0.0019)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)    (0.0006)  (0.0005)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0004) 
Rural  population -0.0427 -0.0512  -0.0727***  -0.0886***  -0.0592**    -0.0038 -0.0099  -0.0120 -0.0178* -0.0013 
   growth(%)  (0.0359)  (0.0367)  (0.0269)  (0.0294)  (0.0289)    (0.0134)  (0.0132)  (0.0090)  (0.0092)  (0.0082) 
Real  yield  1.3197***  1.2856*** 1.2121***  1.1824*** 1.1168***    0.4646*** 0.4388*** 0.4343*** 0.4251*** 0.3545*** 
  (0.2172)  (0.2171) (0.2116)  (0.2050) (0.2353)    (0.0732)  (0.0700) (0.0847) (0.0816) (0.0884) 
Capital  costs  /  -2.2591***  -2.2187*** -2.2234***  -2.2808*** -2.2727***   -0.7675*** -0.7366*** -0.7871*** -0.8010*** -0.7158*** 
   Assets  (0.3537)  (0.3528)  (0.3222)  (0.3262)  (0.3717)    (0.1355)  (0.1351)  (0.1291)  (0.1266)  (0.1447) 
Labor  costs  /  -2.1278***  -2.1126*** -2.0294***  -1.9515*** -1.8692***   -0.9483*** -0.9361*** -0.8556*** -0.8356*** -0.5747*** 
   Assets  (0.3611)  (0.3600)  (0.3636)  (0.3505)  (0.3489)    (0.2636)  (0.2589)  (0.2547)  (0.2495)  (0.1441) 
Log of MFI age  -0.0043  -0.0039  0.0023  0.0057  0.0122    -0.0211*  -0.0207*  -0.0232**  -0.0221**  -0.0112 
  (0.0260)  (0.0256) (0.0236)  (0.0232) (0.0254)    (0.0125)  (0.0123) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0071) 
Log of assets         0.0091  0.0087  0.0183**  0.0195**  0.0104    0.0055**  0.0051**  0.0086***  0.0091***  0.0071** 
   (PPP)  (0.0092)  (0.0093)  (0.0082)  (0.0084)  (0.0094)   (0.0025)  (0.0026)  (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0033) 
Village banking  0.0909*  0.0906*  0.1166** 0.1196** 0.1226**   0.0229  0.0230 0.0276 0.0291 0.0234 
   lending  (0.0498)  (0.0495)  (0.0459)  (0.0467)  (0.0494)    (0.0200)  (0.0198)  (0.0179)  (0.0180)  (0.0173) 
Solidarity  group  -0.0435  -0.0435  -0.0295  -0.0341  -0.0385    0.0080  0.0080 0.0096 0.0082 0.0004 
   lending  (0.0365)  (0.0367)  (0.0344)  (0.0347)  (0.0348)    (0.0105)  (0.0106)  (0.0101)  (0.0099)  (0.0103) 
Inflation  -0.0000  -0.0008 -0.0024  -0.0036 -0.0025    -0.0007  -0.0013 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0007 
  (0.0041)  (0.0039) (0.0032)  (0.0032) (0.0037)    (0.0014)  (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0015) 
KKM  -0.0587  -0.0354  -0.0760  -0.0574  -0.1197**    -0.0018  0.0151 -0.0020 0.0051 -0.0217 
  (0.0612)  (0.0631) (0.0507)  (0.0525) (0.0489)    (0.0245)  (0.0276) (0.0199) (0.0209) (0.0152) 
GDP    0.0203** 0.0205** 0.0240*** 0.0205** 0.0227***   0.0051  0.0053  0.0075**  0.0061*  0.0053* 
   growth rate  (0.0097)  (0.0095)  (0.0086)  (0.0088)  (0.0080)    (0.0039)  (0.0038)  (0.0034)  (0.0035)  (0.0029) 
Europe  and  -0.0865 -0.0905  -0.1064 -0.1336* -0.0897    -0.0185 -0.0211  -0.0351 -0.0428* -0.0005 
   Central Asia  (0.0718)  (0.0716)  (0.0720)  (0.0691)  (0.0737)    (0.0258)  (0.0256)  (0.0259)  (0.0246)  (0.0242) 
Africa  0.0082 0.0077  0.0990 0.1055 0.1440*    0.0005 0.0027  -0.0260 -0.0236 -0.0090 
  (0.1027)  (0.0976) (0.0772)  (0.0774) (0.0811)    (0.0366)  (0.0328) (0.0271) (0.0267) (0.0210) 
South  Asia  -0.3743*** -0.3492*** -0.3387*** -0.2838***  -0.1189   -0.1677**  -0.1457**  -0.1731***  -0.1499**  -0.0363 
  (0.1178)  (0.1088) (0.0989)  (0.1064) (0.0746)    (0.0709)  (0.0587) (0.0664) (0.0649) (0.0238) 
East Asia and  -0.0557  -0.0358  -0.0780  -0.0397  -0.0469    -0.0495*  -0.0318  -0.0549**  -0.0405*  -0.0279 
   Pacific  (0.0816)  (0.0664)  (0.0601)  (0.0628)  (0.0573)    (0.0258)  (0.0211)  (0.0215)  (0.0210)  (0.0178) 
Middle-East  and -0.1849 -0.1383  -0.0087  0.0868  0.0024    -0.0576 -0.0176  -0.0250  0.0165  -0.0021 
   North Africa  (0.1397)  (0.1202)  (0.0847)  (0.1049)  (0.0782)    (0.0488)  (0.0397)  (0.0273)  (0.0338)  (0.0202) 
Constant 0.8505***  0.9115***  0.7060***  0.7990***  0.9268***    -0.0159  0.0290  -0.0939*  -0.0626  -0.0589 
  (0.2005)  (0.2066) (0.1803)  (0.1806) (0.1983)    (0.0558)  (0.0658) (0.0543) (0.0532) (0.0561) 
Observations  298  298 352 352 301    299  299 353 353 302 
Number of firms  213  213  251  251  215    213  213  251  251  215 
Adjusted R





Table 4. Comparison of MFI characteristics by level of branch penetration 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. The 
sample is split into low and high branch penetration at the median. Geographic branch penetration is the number of bank branches in a 
country measured per square kilometer and demographic branch penetration is the number of bank branches measured per capita. 
NGO is a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is a non-governmental organization. Commercially funded is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the majority of funding comes from commercial sources. Village banking lending is a dummy variable that 
takes the value one if village bank lenders make loans to larger groups. Solidarity group lending and individual lending are dummy 
variables equal to one if the loan is made to an individual, but the former assumes joint liability. Log of MFI age is the log of the age 
of the institution and Log of Assets(PPP) is the log of total assets in purchasing power parity terms. Rural population is the share of 
rural population in 1990. Rural population growth is the annual growth rate of the rural population averaged over 1991 – 2000. KKM 
is the Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi index of institutional development. GDP growth rate is annual real GDP growth rate. 
 
  Geographic branch penetration    Demographic branch penetration 
 Low  High  Difference    Low  High  Difference 
NGO 0.400  0.600  -0.2000**    0.454  0.553  -0.0991 
     (0.0673)        (0.0697) 
Commercially funded  0.567  0.565  0.0026    0.534  0.620  -0.0858 
     (0.0729)        (0.0741) 
Individual lending  0.374  0.330  0.0439    0.331  0.388  -0.0575 
     (0.0655)        (0.0674) 
Village banking lending  0.130 0.190 -0.0596    0.154 0.165  -0.0109 
     (0.0505)        (0.0514) 
Solidarity group lending  0.530  0.550  -0.0196    0.569  0.494  0.0751 
     (0.0684)        (0.0698) 
Capital costs / Assets  0.089  0.076  0.0132    0.086  0.079  0.0076 
     (0.0082)        (0.0083) 
Labor costs / Assets  0.104  0.093  0.0112    0.099  0.098  0.0013 
     (0.0095)        (0.0099) 
Log of MFI age  1.926  2.150  -0.2240*    1.945  2.161  -0.2157* 
     (0.1045)        (0.1084) 
Log of assets(PPP)  16.181 15.982  0.1986    16.231 15.870 0.3608 
     (0.3341)        (0.3585) 
Rural population (%, 1990)  55.189  47.926  7.2632    59.658  43.458  16.2000* 
     (6.7826)        (6.3387) 
Rural population growth (%)  0.806  0.314  0.4920    0.952  0.168  0.7840 
     (0.4586)        (0.4472) 
Real Yield  0.243  0.209  0.0339    0.221  0.230  -0.0093 
     (0.0468)        (0.0471) 
Inflation 9.422  9.057  0.3655    9.320  9.159  0.1603 
     (3.2719)        (3.2723) 
KKM -0.429  -0.244  -0.1845    -0.621  -0.052  -0.5696*** 
     (0.1665)        (0.1402) 
GDP growth rate  3.914  5.047  -1.1335    4.088  4.873  -0.7846 




Table 5. The effect of bank branch penetration on the average loan size by type of MFI 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. P-values from corresponding F-tests are in square brackets at the bottom of 
the table. All models estimated via ordinary least squares. Standard errors allow for clustering at the firm level. Average loan size is the average loan size relative to the average per capita income of the 
bottom 20% in the country. Geographic branch penetration is the number of bank branches in a country measured per square kilometer and demographic branch penetration is the number of bank 
branches measured per capita. NGO is a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is a non-governmental organization. Commercially funded is a dummy variable equal to one if the majority of 
funding comes from commercial sources. Individual lending is a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is made to an individual. Though we do not present the coefficients to conserve space, all 
models include all of the controls that appear in the base results in Tables 2 and 3. These are real portfolio yield, capital costs/assets, labor costs/assets, village banking dummy, solidarity group lending 
dummy, log of MFI age, log of total assets, inflation rate, real GDP growth rate, KKM index of institutional development, rural population share, rural population growth rate, and regional dummies.  
 
  Dependent Variable: Average Loan Size 
  Demographic branch penetration    Geographic branch penetration 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Branch penetration  -0.3159***  -0.1236  -0.0210  0.0198    -0.0542*  0.0080  0.0139  0.0021 
  (0.1035)  (0.0844)  (0.0732)  (0.0785)  (0.0302)  (0.0252)  (0.0133)  (0.0495) 
NGO -1.7448**      -0.9679    -1.3409**      -0.7602 
  (0.8524)      (0.7856)  (0.5960)      (0.6564) 
NGO × Branch   0.1355      0.1064   0.0514*      0.0535 
   Penetration  (0.1003)      (0.0924)    (0.0309)      (0.0449) 
Commercially   2.6670***    1.5876**      1.2898*    0.8688 
   Funded    (0.8890)    (0.7051)      (0.7021)    (0.6247) 
Commercially funded ×    -0.4588***    -0.3265***      -0.0644*    -0.0777*** 
   Branch penetration    (0.1418)    (0.0966)      (0.0347)    (0.0299) 
Individual lending      5.9576***  5.8488***        3.1030***  3.1366*** 
     (1.6384)  (1.7232)        (0.9234)  (1.0615) 
Individual lending ×      -0.5856***  -0.5983***        -0.0837**  -0.1240** 
   Branch penetration      (0.1831)  (0.1923)        (0.0411)  (0.0550) 
Observations  342 299 342 299    342 299 342 299 
Number of firms  238  223  238  223    238  223  238  223 
Adjusted R
2  0.2347  0.2590  0.3156  0.3447  0.1990  0.1922  0.2199  0.2288 
Branch penetration + Interaction term 
   NGO  -0.1804*      0.1262    -0.0028      0.0556** 
  [0.0598]      [0.2207]  [0.8356]      [0.0245] 
   Commercially funded    -0.5824***    -0.3067***      -0.0564**    -0.0756 
   [0.0001]  [0.0055]     [0.0206]  [0.1669] 
   Individual lending      -0.6066***  -0.5785***        -0.0698*  -0.1219* 




Table 6. The effect of branch penetration on the percent women borrowers by type of MFI 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. P-values from corresponding F-tests are in square brackets at the bottom of 
the table. All models estimated via ordinary least squares. Standard errors allow for clustering at the firm level. Percent women borrowers is the share of women borrowers of a microfinance institution. 
Geographic branch penetration is the number of bank branches in a country measured per square kilometer and demographic branch penetration is the number of bank branches measured per capita. 
NGO is a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is a non-governmental organization. Commercially funded is a dummy variable equal to one if the majority of funding comes from commercial 
sources. Individual lending is a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is made to an individual. Though we do not present the coefficients to conserve space, all models include all of the controls that 
appear in the base results in Tables 2 and 3. These are real portfolio yield, capital costs/assets, labor costs/assets, village banking dummy, solidarity group lending dummy, log of MFI age, log of total 
assets, inflation rate, real GDP growth rate, KKM index of institutional development, rural population share, rural population growth rate, and regional dummies.   
 
  Dependent Variable: Percent Women Borrowers  
  Demographic branch penetration    Geographic branch penetration 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Branch penetration  -0.0047  -0.0073  -0.0010  -0.0031    0.0056*  0.0020  0.0058*  -0.0034 
  (0.0097)  (0.0093)  (0.0083)  (0.0127)  (0.0032)  (0.0035)  (0.0033)  (0.0063) 
NGO  0.0841      0.0368  0.0844      0.0141 
  (0.0663)      (0.0707)  (0.0535)      (0.0584) 
NGO × Branch   0.0020      0.0094  0.0004      0.0038 
   penetration  (0.0095)      (0.0105)    (0.0031)      (0.0049) 
Commercially   -0.0976  -0.0757      -0.1756***    -0.1398** 
   funded    (0.0670)    (0.0725)      (0.0576)    (0.0618) 
Commercially funded ×    0.0109    0.0132      0.0143***    0.0142*** 
   Branch penetration    (0.0126)    (0.0126)      (0.0041)    (0.0040) 
Individual lending      -0.1862***  -0.0847        -0.2348***  -0.2053*** 
     (0.0712)  (0.0793)        (0.0526)  (0.0533) 
Individual lending ×      -0.0073  -0.0210*        0.0007  0.0043 
   Branch penetration      (0.0103)  (0.0117)        (0.0037)  (0.0031) 
Observations  285 246 285 246    285 246 285 246 
Number of firms  206  188  206  188    206  188  206  188 
Adjusted R
2  0.2181  0.2084  0.2511  0.2653  0.2421  0.2906  0.2741  0.3195 
Branch penetration + Interaction term 
   NGO  -0.0027      0.0063    0.0060**      0.0004 
  [0.7446]      [0.5588]  [0.0380]      [0.9018] 
   Commercially funded    0.0036    0.0101      0.0163***    0.0108* 
   [0.7588]  [0.4912]     [0.0000]  [0.0566] 
   Individual lending      -0.0083  -0.0241**        0.0065**  0.0009 








Table 7. The effect of bank branch penetration on the financial self-sufficiency index by type of MFI 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. P-values from corresponding F-tests are in square brackets at the bottom of 
the table. All models estimated via ordinary least squares. Standard errors allow for clustering at the firm level. The financial self-sufficiency index is a ratio which is greater than one if the institution 
generates sufficient revenue to cover its costs. Geographic branch penetration is the number of bank branches in a country measured per square kilometer and demographic branch penetration is the 
number of bank branches measured per capita. NGO is a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is a non-governmental organization. Commercially funded is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
majority of funding comes from commercial sources. Individual lending is a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is made to an individual. Though we do not present the coefficients to conserve 
space, all models include all of the controls that appear in the base results in Tables 2 and 3. These are real portfolio yield, capital costs/assets, labor costs/assets, village banking dummy, solidarity group 
lending dummy, log of MFI age, log of total assets, inflation rate, real GDP growth rate, KKM index of institutional development, rural population share, rural population growth rate, and regional 
dummies.   
 
  Dependent Variable: Financial Self-sufficiency Index 
  Demographic branch penetration    Geographic branch penetration 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Branch  penetration  -0.0044 -0.0064 -0.0098  -0.0137*    0.0006  0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0042 
  (0.0073)  (0.0063)  (0.0064)  (0.0075)  (0.0032)  (0.0020)  (0.0031)  (0.0054) 
NGO  -0.0227      -0.0378  -0.0201      -0.0208 
  (0.0531)      (0.0517)  (0.0373)      (0.0390) 
NGO × Branch   0.0002      0.0055  -0.0000      0.0030 
   Penetration  (0.0073)      (0.0083)    (0.0022)      (0.0048) 
Commercially   0.0069    -0.0012      0.1164**    0.0956* 
   Funded    (0.0609)    (0.0588)      (0.0573)    (0.0561) 
Commercially funded ×    0.0129    0.0151*      -0.0066    -0.0035 
   Branch penetration    (0.0087)    (0.0089)      (0.0053)    (0.0052) 
Individual lending      -0.0772  -0.0745        -0.0355  -0.0567 
     (0.0519)  (0.0493)        (0.0385)  (0.0383) 
Individual lending ×      0.0132*  0.0108        0.0052*  0.0057* 
   Branch penetration      (0.0074)  (0.0076)        (0.0027)  (0.0029) 
Observations  298 264 298 264    298 264 298 264 
Number of firms  213  200  213  200    213  200  213  200 
Adjusted R
2  0.4544  0.4702  0.4492  0.4610  0.4531  0.4700  0.4488  0.4587 
Branch penetration + Interaction term 
   NGO  -0.0042      -0.0082    0.0006      -0.0012 
  [0.4505]      [0.2979]  [0.7978]      [0.6817] 
   Commercially funded    0.0065    0.0014      -0.0062    -0.0077 
   [0.3388]  [0.8661]     [0.2723]  [0.2700] 
   Individual lending      0.0034  -0.0029        0.0041*  0.0015 







Table 8. The effect of geographic branch penetration on the outreach indicators by type of MFI, “old” MFIs only 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. P-values from corresponding F-tests are in square brackets at the bottom of 
the table. All models estimated via ordinary least squares. Standard errors allow for clustering at the firm level. The sample includes only those MFIs that were in existence prior to 1996. Average loan 
size is the average loan size relative to the average per capita income of the bottom 20% in the country. Percent women borrowers is the share of women borrowers of a microfinance institution. 
Geographic branch penetration is the number of bank branches in a country measured per square kilometer. NGO is a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is a non-governmental organization. 
Commercially funded is a dummy variable equal to one if the majority of funding comes from commercial sources. Individual lending is a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is made to an 
individual. Though we do not present the coefficients to conserve space, all models include all of the controls that appear in the base results in Tables 2 and 3. These are real portfolio yield, capital 
costs/assets, labor costs/assets, village banking dummy, solidarity group lending dummy, log of MFI age, log of total assets, inflation rate, real GDP growth rate, KKM index of institutional 
development, rural population share, rural population growth rate, and regional dummies.   
 
 Sample:  Microfinance  institutions in existence prior to 1996 
  Average loan size    Percent women borrowers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Geographic branch  -0.0386  -0.1028  -0.0338  -0.0109    0.0188***  0.0219*  0.0125  0.0165*** 
   Penetration  (0.0320)  (0.0734)  (0.0750)  (0.0305)    (0.0068)  (0.0121)  (0.0075)  (0.0060) 
NGO   -1.9842          0.1602*     
   (1.2365)          (0.0914)     
NGO × Branch     0.0976          -0.0058     
   Penetration    (0.0735)          (0.0078)     
Commercially      1.0464         -0.3198***  
   Funded      (2.1584)          (0.0891)   
Commercially funded ×      -0.0180          0.0120**   
   Branch penetration      (0.0975)          (0.0046)   
Individual lending        2.7400**          -0.2689*** 
       (1.1344)          (0.0849) 
Individual lending ×        -0.1610*          0.0008 
   Branch penetration        (0.0889)          (0.0048) 
Observations  169 169 146 169    138 138 116 138 
Number of firms  120  120  112  120    102  102  92  102 
Adjusted R
2  0.2911  0.3089  0.2793  0.3354  0.3322  0.3430  0.4287  0.3823 
Branch penetration + Interaction term 
   NGO    -0.0052          0.0161**     
   [0.8819]          [0.0240]     
   Commercially funded      -0.0518          0.0245***   
     [0.2794]        [0.0000]  
   Individual lending        -0.1719*          0.0173** 







Table 9. The effect of geographic branch penetration on the performance indicators by type of MFI, “old” MFIs only 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. P-values from corresponding F-tests are in square brackets at the bottom of 
the table. All models estimated via ordinary least squares. Standard errors allow for clustering at the firm level. The sample includes only those MFIs that were in existence prior to 1996. The financial 
self-sufficiency index is a ratio which is greater than one if the institution generates sufficient revenue to cover its costs. Geographic branch penetration is the number of bank branches in a country 
measured per square kilometer. NGO is a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is a non-governmental organization. Commercially funded is a dummy variable equal to one if the majority of 
funding comes from commercial sources. Individual lending is a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is made to an individual. Though we do not present the coefficients to conserve space, all 
models include all of the controls that appear in the base results in Tables 2 and 3. These are real portfolio yield, capital costs/assets, labor costs/assets, village banking dummy, solidarity group lending 
dummy, log of MFI age, log of total assets, inflation rate, real GDP growth rate, KKM index of institutional development, rural population share, rural population growth rate, and regional dummies.   
 
 Sample:  Microfinance  institutions in existence prior to 1996 
 Financial  self-sufficiency index    Return on assets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Geographic branch  -0.0217**  -0.0136  -0.0259**  -0.0236**    -0.0011  0.0002  -0.0030  -0.0022 
   Penetration  (0.0101)  (0.0101)  (0.0104)  (0.0108)    (0.0040)  (0.0047)  (0.0039)  (0.0038) 
NGO   0.0136          0.0334     
   (0.0509)          (0.0267)     
NGO × Branch     -0.0124**          -0.0031     
   Penetration    (0.0057)          (0.0022)     
Commercially     0.0088        -0.0490  
   Funded      (0.0768)          (0.0572)   
Commercially funded ×      0.0109          0.0066   
   Branch penetration      (0.0076)          (0.0055)   
Individual lending        -0.1146**          -0.0634* 
       (0.0527)          (0.0322) 
Individual lending ×        0.0033          -0.0018 
   Branch penetration        (0.0069)          (0.0022) 
Observations  157 157 137 157    158 158 137 158 
Number of firms  114  114  106  114    114  114  106  114 
Adjusted R
2  0.5751  0.5880  0.5746  0.5685  0.4288  0.4256  0.4405  0.4455 
Branch penetration + Interaction term 
   NGO    -0.0260***          -0.0029     
   [0.0072]          [0.3968]     
   Commercially funded      -0.0150          0.0036   
     [0.1838]        [0.5596]  
   Individual lending        -0.0203**          -0.0040 






Table 10. The effect of bank branch penetration on the average loan size by type of MFI, controlling for banking sector ownership and 
concentration 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. P-values 
from corresponding F-tests are in square brackets at the bottom of the table. All models estimated via ordinary least squares. Standard 
errors allow for clustering at the firm level. Average loan size is the average loan size relative to the average per capita income of the 
bottom 20% in the country. Geographic branch penetration is the number of bank branches in a country measured per square kilometer 
and demographic branch penetration is the number of bank branches measured per capita. NGO is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the institution is a non-governmental organization. Commercially funded is a dummy variable equal to one if the majority of funding 
comes from commercial sources. Individual lending is a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is made to an individual. State 
ownership and foreign ownership are the shares of total banking sector assets held by state- and foreign-owned banks, respectively. 
Bank concentration is the share of sector assets held by the three largest banks. Though we do not present the coefficients to conserve 
space, all models include all of the controls that appear in the base results in Tables 2 and 3. These are real portfolio yield, capital 
costs/assets, labor costs/assets, village banking dummy, solidarity group lending dummy, log of MFI age, log of total assets, inflation 
rate, real GDP growth rate, KKM index of institutional development, rural population share, rural population growth rate, and regional 
dummies.   
 
  Dependent Variable: Average Loan size 
  Demographic branch penetration    Geographic branch penetration 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Branch penetration  -0.2934***  -0.3965***  -0.2746**  -0.1107    -0.0730**  -0.1075***  -0.0789*  -0.0427 
  (0.0854) (0.0962) (0.1181) (0.0917)    (0.0354)  (0.0386)  (0.0417)  (0.0287) 
NGO   -2.2070*          -1.1176     
   (1.2267)          (0.7823)     
NGO × Branch     0.2662**          0.0509     
   Penetration    (0.1208)          (0.0325)     
Commercially     1.0886          1.2210   
   Funded      (1.5018)          (1.2328)   
Commercially funded ×      -0.1850          -0.1018   
   Branch penetration      (0.1724)          (0.0776)   
Individual lending        5.5122***          3.4630*** 
       (1.7418)          (1.0538) 
Individual lending ×        -0.4458***          -0.0733** 
   Branch penetration        (0.1640)          (0.0339) 
State ownership  -9.4546***  -8.9381**  -9.8883***  -8.5083***    -10.6893***  -9.5624**  -11.6878***  -11.3162*** 
  (3.2855) (3.5255) (3.7317) (2.9726)    (3.9922)  (4.2163)  (4.4215)  (3.9679) 
Foreign  ownership  1.6877 2.2486 1.7950 0.7531    0.8921  1.1400  0.8036  0.5798 
  (1.5539) (1.7024) (1.7596) (1.2960)    (1.4993)  (1.5513)  (1.6788)  (1.4140) 
Bank  concentration  -9.2244*** -9.4244*** -9.8555*** -8.2848***   -9.1859***  -9.1362*** -10.5158***  -9.1972*** 
  (2.7966) (2.7806) (3.4489) (2.4676)    (3.1299)  (3.1287)  (3.6183)  (3.0159) 
Observations  234 234 205 234    234  234  205  234 
Number of firms  177  177  167  177    177  177  167  177 
Adjusted R
2  29 29 28 29    29  29  28  29 
Branch penetration + Interaction term 
   NGO    -0.1303          -0.0566     
   [0.2752]          [0.1103]     
   Commercially funded      -0.4596***          -0.1807**   
     [0.0010]          [0.0204]   
   Individual lending        -0.5565***          -0.1160*** 












Table 11. The effect of bank branch penetration on the percent women borrowers by type of MFI, controlling for banking sector 
ownership and concentration 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. P-values 
from corresponding F-tests are in square brackets at the bottom of the table. All models estimated via ordinary least squares. Standard 
errors allow for clustering at the firm level. Percent women borrowers is the share of women borrowers of a microfinance institution. 
Geographic branch penetration is the number of bank branches in a country measured per square kilometer and demographic branch 
penetration is the number of bank branches measured per capita. NGO is a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is a non-
governmental organization. Commercially funded is a dummy variable equal to one if the majority of funding comes from commercial 
sources. Individual lending is a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is made to an individual. State ownership and foreign 
ownership are the shares of total banking sector assets held by state- and foreign-owned banks, respectively. Bank concentration is the 
share of sector assets held by the three largest banks. Though we do not present the coefficients to conserve space, all models include 
all of the controls that appear in the base results in Tables 2 and 3. These are real portfolio yield, capital costs/assets, labor 
costs/assets, village banking dummy, solidarity group lending dummy, log of MFI age, log of total assets, inflation rate, real GDP 
growth rate, KKM index of institutional development, rural population share, rural population growth rate, and regional dummies.   
 
  Dependent Variable: Percent Women Borrowers 
  Demographic branch penetration    Geographic branch penetration 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Branch  penetration  0.0027  0.0093  -0.0095  -0.0000  -0.0019  0.0010  -0.0035  -0.0029 
  (0.0075)  (0.0081)  (0.0105)  (0.0086)  (0.0031)  (0.0037)  (0.0035)  (0.0030) 
NGO   0.2370***          0.1632**     
   (0.0834)          (0.0630)     
NGO × Branch     -0.0194**          -0.0046     
   penetration    (0.0094)          (0.0033)     
Commercially      -0.1541*         -0.0974  
   funded      (0.0890)          (0.0832)   
Commercially funded ×      0.0286**          0.0117*   
   Branch penetration      (0.0134)          (0.0061)   
Individual lending        -0.1923**          -0.1902*** 
       (0.0753)          (0.0529) 
Individual lending ×        0.0054          0.0041** 
   Branch penetration        (0.0095)          (0.0019) 
State ownership  -0.4768**  -0.6187**  -0.6062**  -0.4538**    -0.5707**  -0.7483**  -0.5378*  -0.4972** 
  (0.2385)  (0.2644)  (0.2631)  (0.2168)  (0.2595)  (0.3007)  (0.2918)  (0.2454) 
Foreign  ownership  -0.2181  -0.2903  -0.0176  -0.2241  -0.2316  -0.2599  -0.0518  -0.2435 
  (0.1777)  (0.1847)  (0.2016)  (0.1702)  (0.1679)  (0.1742)  (0.2104)  (0.1621) 
Bank concentration  -0.4224**  -0.4225**  -0.6111***  -0.4078**    -0.4592**  -0.5015**  -0.5108**  -0.4264** 
  (0.1876)  (0.1879)  (0.2314)  (0.1835)  (0.1933)  (0.1927)  (0.2284)  (0.1899) 
Observations  193 193 166 193    193 193 166 193 
Number of firms  147  147  135  147    147  147  135  147 
Adjusted R
2  27  27  26  27  27  27  26  27 
Branch penetration + Interaction term 
   NGO    -0.0101          -0.0036     
   [0.2768]          [0.2847]     
   Commercially funded      0.0191*          0.0082   
     [0.0888]        [0.1845]  
   Individual lending        0.0054          0.0012 












Table 12. The effect of bank branch penetration on the financial self-sufficiency index by type of MFI, controlling for banking sector 
ownership and concentration 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. P-values 
from corresponding F-tests are in square brackets at the bottom of the table. All models estimated via ordinary least squares. Standard 
errors allow for clustering at the firm level. The financial self-sufficiency index is a ratio which is greater than one if the institution 
generates sufficient revenue to cover its costs. Geographic branch penetration is the number of bank branches in a country measured 
per square kilometer and demographic branch penetration is the number of bank branches measured per capita. NGO is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the institution is a non-governmental organization. Commercially funded is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the majority of funding comes from commercial sources. Individual lending is a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is made to an 
individual. State ownership and foreign ownership are the shares of total banking sector assets held by state- and foreign-owned 
banks, respectively. Bank concentration is the share of sector assets held by the three largest banks. Though we do not present the 
coefficients to conserve space, all models include all of the controls that appear in the base results in Tables 2 and 3. These are real 
portfolio yield, capital costs/assets, labor costs/assets, village banking dummy, solidarity group lending dummy, log of MFI age, log of 
total assets, inflation rate, real GDP growth rate, KKM index of institutional development, rural population share, rural population 
growth rate, and regional dummies.   
 
  Dependent Variable: Financial Self-sufficiency Index 
  Demographic branch penetration    Geographic branch penetration 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Branch penetration  -0.0067  -0.0082  -0.0064  -0.0113**    0.0027  0.0022  0.0032  0.0016 
  (0.0047)  (0.0054)  (0.0058)  (0.0057)  (0.0024)  (0.0031)  (0.0019)  (0.0025) 
NGO   -0.0291          -0.0167     
   (0.0715)          (0.0489)     
NGO × Branch     0.0038          0.0007     
   penetration    (0.0079)          (0.0021)     
Commercially     0.0009        0.0478  
   funded      (0.0683)          (0.0609)   
Commercially funded ×      0.0076          -0.0010   
   Branch penetration      (0.0090)          (0.0057)   
Individual lending        -0.1349**          -0.1203*** 
       (0.0613)          (0.0415) 
Individual lending ×        0.0083          0.0040** 
   Branch penetration        (0.0078)          (0.0015) 
State  ownership  -0.2296  -0.2251  -0.1522  -0.2750  -0.0905  -0.0734  0.0297  -0.0865 
  (0.1550)  (0.1575)  (0.1684)  (0.1752)  (0.1565)  (0.1639)  (0.1693)  (0.1677) 
Foreign ownership  -0.2792**  -0.2713**  -0.2264  -0.2923**    -0.2567**  -0.2527*  -0.2084  -0.2840** 
  (0.1369)  (0.1329)  (0.1557)  (0.1466)  (0.1298)  (0.1294)  (0.1425)  (0.1373) 
Bank  concentration  0.1545  0.1514  0.2093  0.1044  0.2278  0.2284*  0.2998**  0.2028 
  (0.1332)  (0.1314)  (0.1336)  (0.1423)  (0.1379)  (0.1368)  (0.1403)  (0.1456) 
Observations  171 171 162 171    171 171 162 171 
Number of firms  29  29  28  29    29  29  28  29 
Adjusted R
2  0.4951  0.4907  0.5064  0.4860  0.4936  0.4890  0.5072  0.4867 
Branch penetration + Interaction term 
   NGO    -0.0044          0.0029     
   [0.5300]          [0.2312]     
   Commercially funded      0.0012          0.0022   
     [0.8441]        [0.7119]  
   Individual lending        -0.0030          0.0056** 









Table 13. The effect of variables representing the development of the banking sector on the outreach and performance of MFIs, instrumental variables regressions 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. All models estimated via two-stage least squares(IV). Standard errors allow 
for clustering at the firm level. Average loan size is the average loan size relative to the average per capita income of the bottom 20% in the country. Percent women borrowers is the share of women 
borrowers of a microfinance institution. The financial self-sufficiency index is a ratio which is greater than one if the institution generates sufficient revenue to cover its costs. Geographic branch 
penetration is the number of bank branches in a country measured per square kilometer and demographic branch penetration is the number of bank branches measured per capita. Branch penetration 
variables were instrumented using dummy variables representing the legal origin of the country. Legal origin variables are dummy variables that take on the value one if the legal origin is either French, 
German, Socialist or English, respectively. Private credit / GDP and Liquid liabilities / GDP are the ratios of private credit and liquid liabilities to GDP, respectively, where GDP is gross domestic 
product. Interest rate spread is the difference between prevailing lending and deposit interest rates. Rural population(%, 1990) is the share of rural population in 1990. Rural population growth is the 
annual growth rate of the rural population averaged over 1991 – 2000.  Log of MFI age is the log of the age of the institution and Log of Assets(PPP) is the log of total assets in purchasing power parity 
terms. Village banking lending is a dummy variable that takes the value one if village bank lenders make loans to larger groups. Solidarity group lending and individual lending are dummy variables 
equal to one if the loan is made to an individual, but the former assumes joint liability. Individual lending dummy is the omitted category. KKM is the Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi index of institutional 
development. GDP growth rate is annual real GDP growth rate. Europe and Central Asia, Africa, South Asia, East Asia and Pacific, Middle East and North Africa are dummy variables that take the 
value one if the country is located in Europe and Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, East Asia and Pacific, Middle East and North Africa, respectively. The excludability test is based on 
an OLS regression in which the instruments replace the branch penetration variable. The hope is that the instruments are insignificant, and thus can be viewed as excludable. 
 

























   (1)  (2)     (3)  (4)     (5)  (6)     (7)  (8) 
Financial variable  -0.3145**  -0.2875**     -0.0034  0.0044     -0.0088  -0.0221**     -0.0054  -0.0088** 
   (0.1482)  (0.1154)     (0.0106)  (0.0132)     (0.0083)  (0.0093)     (0.0034)  (0.0036) 
Observations  342 342  285 285  298  298  299 299 
Number of firms  238  238  206  206  213  213  213  213 
Adjusted R-squared  -0.2342  0.2235     0.1692  0.2027     0.4175  0.4320     0.2740  0.3615 
Hausman test 
Chi-sq p-value  0.0051  0.7513  0.3198  0.434  0.1474  0.0201  0.0268  0.0661 
Shea Partial R-
squared  0.0443 0.2604  0.0417 0.2445  0.0952  0.2905  0.0955 0.2902 
Excludability 
Instruments  French + German + Socialist 
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Appendix A. Variable Description and Summary Statistics 
Variable Name  Definition  Mean  Median  Min  Max 
Average loan size 
 
Average loan size relative to the average 
per capita income of bottom 20%  2.05  1.18  0  37.78 
Women borrowers(%)  Share of women borrowers  0.68  0.72  0  1 
Financial self- 
   sufficiency index 
Ratio greater than one if institution gen-
erates sufficient revenue to cover its cost  1.04  1.04  -0.6  2.62 
Return on assets  Adjusted return on  assets  -0.02 0.01 -1.66 0.41 
Geographic 
   branch penetration 
Number of bank branches 
measured per square kilometer  7.86  3.15  0.13  79.18 
Demographic 
   branch penetration  Number of bank branches per capita  5.29  4.17  0.41  23.36 
Private credit / GDP 
 
Ratio of private credit to GDP,  
averaged over 1991 - 2000  0.23  0.21  0.03  1.23 
Liquid liabilities / 
GDP 
Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP,  
averaged over 1991 - 2000  0.32  0.27  0.07  1.05 
Interest rate spread 
 
Difference between  
lending rate and deposit rate  21.49  10.06  2.48  183.65 
Rural population   
   (%, 1990) 
Rural population as a % of  
total population in 1990  55.86  51.2  16  94.6 
Rural population  
   growth 
Annual rural population growth,  
averaged over 1991 - 2000  0.77  0.86  -3.79  3.36 
Real yield  Real portfolio yield  0.23  0.21  -0.13  0.98 
Capital costs / assets     0.08  0.06  0  0.39 
Labor costs / assets     0.1  0.08  0.01  0.46 
Log of MFI age  Log of the age of the MFI  2.07  2.08  0  3.87 
Log of assets(PPP) 
 
Log of assets in purchasing power  
parity terms  16.23  16.32  4.29  26.25 
Village banking 
lending 
Dummy equal to one if the MFI does  
village style lending  0.15  0  0  1 
Solidarity group 
lending 
Dummy equal to one if the MFI lends to 
individual but assumes joint liability  0.59  1  0  1 
Individual lending 
 
Dummy equal to one if the MFI  
lends to individual   0.79  1  0  1 
Inflation     8.09  6.01  -4.57  51.46 
KKM  Governance Index (Kaufmann et al)  -0.51  -0.48  -1.59  1.25 
GDP growth rate     5.33  5.05  -7.72  17.85 
Europe 
   and Central Asia     0.2  0  0  1 
Sub-Saharan Africa     0.21  0  0  1 
South  Asia      0.08  0 0 1 
East Asia and Pacific     0.17  0  0  1 
Middle-East 
   and North Africa     0.07  0  0  1 
Latin America 
   and Caribbean     0.28  0  0  1 
 
 